FOR THE MASSES OF ASSES - JUST TRYING TO FIX STUPID
FICTION OF LAW
Well People, It's about time to wake up and smell the coffee.
What I am about to give you is nothing but the truth from the
courts and laws of the United States. When you know what to look
for you will find it in the oddest places. Places that the
ordinary man would not expect to find it. Every one talks about
government being a corporation as cited in 28 USC 3002 (15).
Every one complains when taken to court where is the contract.
All people argue these contracts, whether implied, adhesion or
what ever. So there is a lot in common with all the arguments. Of
course when you go into court you most always lose even when
bringing in the law, regulations and court cases that you feel
supports your position.
For years now I have been trying to make people understand that
citizenship, of what ever government nature, is what sucks you
into being a taxpayer, or requiring you to get whatever license
is needed to survive and being controlled by government
(corporation. How the government operates is by Fiction of Law. A
fiction of law is stated from Lectric Law Library on the net as
follows:
The assumption that a certain thing is true, and which gives to a person or thing a quality which
is not natural to it, and consequently establishes, a certain disposition, which, without the fiction,
would be repugnant to reason and to truth. It is an order of things which does not exist, but
which the law prescribes or authorizes. It differs from presumption because it establishes as
true, something which is false; whereas presumption supplies the proof of something true.
The law never feigns what is impossible. Fiction is like art; it imitates nature, but never
disfigures it. It aids truth, but it ought never to destroy it. It may well suppose that what was
possible, but which does not exist; but it will never feign that what was impossible actually is.
Fictions were invented by the Roman praetors who, not possessing the power to abrogate the law,
were nevertheless willing to derogate from it under the pretense of doing equity. Fiction is the
resource of weakness which, in order to obtain its object, assumes as a fact what is known to be
contrary to truth: when the legislator desires to accomplish his object, he need not feign, he
commands. Fictions of law owe their origin to the legislative usurpation's of the bench.
It is said that every fiction must be framed according to the rules of law, and that every
legal fiction must have equity for its object. To prevent their evil effects, they are not allowed
to be carried further than the reasons which introduced them necessarily require.
The law abounds in fictions. That an estate is in abeyance; the doctrine of remitter, by which a
party who has been disseised of his freehold and afterwards acquires a defective title, is remitted
to his former good title; that one thing done today, is considered as done at a preceding time by
the doctrine of relation; that because one thing is proved, another shall be presumed to be true,
which is the case in all presumptions; that the heir, executor, and administrator stand by
representation in the place of the deceased are all fictions of law. "Our various introduction of
John Doe and Richard Roe; our solemn process upon disseisin by Hugh Hunt; our casually losing
and finding a ship (which never was in Europe) in the parish of St. Mary Le Bow, in the ward of
Cheap; our trying the validity of a will by an imaginary wager of five pounds; our imagining and
compassing the king's death, by giving information which may defeat an attack upon an enemy's
settlement in the antipodes; our charge of picking a pocket or forging a bill with force and arms;
of neglecting to repair a bridge, against the peace of the king, his crown and dignity are
circumstances, which, looked at by themselves, would convey an impression of no very favorable
nature, with respect to the wisdom of our jurisprudence."
Now notice that Assumption is the word used to describe how
fiction operates. The word presumption is the opposite, see the
opening paragraph for this sentence "It differs from presumption
because it establishes as true, something which is false; whereas
presumption supplies the proof of something true."
Now lets use this material from Black's 3rd Edition Law book and a case to wit:
Fiction. Derived from Fictio in Roman Law, a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of
the Plaintiff which the defendant is not allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court
jurisdiction. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of "Willful failure to
File," the Plaintiff and court invents the "fiction" that defendant is a "taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person."
Motions and briefs which rely on precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous.
This point was made clear in Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F 2d 221, 225 (9 C.A., 1949)
Now you know why all your arguments are frivolous. You are a
fiction and fictions have no constitutional protection from
encroachment on your unalienable rights. What is this fiction
that you are? This is a list of words or phrases that describe a
fiction, remembering "fiction" is artificial in character,
PERSON, RESIDENT, U.S. CITIZEN, STATE CITIZEN, and INDIVIDUAL.
I am using the full case as it is so important, not only for the
fact that I am writing on Fiction of Law, but other parameters
that I have written long ago and that people pooh-poohed it as
ridiculous as it dealt with admiralty. I had showed where both
revenue and driving was maritime in nature and almost everyone
said I was way off base even though I had shown, through Benedict
on Admiralty, that licensing and registering your car was in the
nature of maritime. So all revenue situations, Income tax and
Driving are in the admiralty jurisdiction because of the maritime
nature. That is why the courts will not tell you the nature is
maritime and the cause is that you have violated your promise to
perform under fiction of law.
Now you are going to say, oh no the Informer is going off the deep end again. Well hear these cases
out and the Fiction of Law premise. Take off the blinders you
have had on so long and use the brain that the Lord gave you. The
Lord did say that not all that have eyes to see will see and,
therefore, if you do not see you will forever be doomed to the
existence you have. I am going to bold and highlight, in the
case, to show how maritime is used whenever you carry passengers
for hire, be it boat, plane, wagon, scooter, rickshaw or car. Do
not lose sight of the fact that you are a fiction and have
contracted with government when reading this case. Oh by the way
go to Find Law and search for Fiction of Law and have a good time reading.
U.S. Supreme Court
ARCHAWSKI v. HANIOTI, 350 U.S. 532 (1956)
350 U.S. 532
ARCHAWSKI ET AL. v. HANIOTI.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT.
No. 351.
Argued March 5, 1956.
Decided April 9, 1956.
A libel in admiralty alleged that petitioners paid moneys to respondent for transportation to
Europe on respondent's vessel, and that respondent breached the contract by abandonment of the
voyage. The libel further alleged that respondent wrongfully appropriated the passage money to
his own use and committed other fraudulent acts. Held: The cause of action alleged
was within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Court. Pp. 532-536.
(a) The essential character of the libel as a claim for breach of a maritime contract was not
altered by the allegations of wrongfulness and fraud. Pp. 534-535.
(b) So long as the claim asserted arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has
jurisdiction over it. P. 535.
(c)Admiralty has jurisdiction even where a libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common
law, provided that the unjust enrichment arose out of the breach of a maritime contract. Pp. 535-
223 F.2d 406, reversed and remanded.
Harry D. Graham argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Israel Convisser argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The sole question in the case is whether the cause of action alleged comes within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the District Court. The District Court held that this was an action on a maritime
contract, within the admiralty jurisdiction, 129 F. Supp. 410. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the suit was in the nature of the [350 U.S. 532, 533] old common law
indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, based upon the wrongful withholding of
money. 223
F.2d 406. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted, 350 U.S. 872, because of
the seeming conflict of that ruling with Krauss Bros. Co. v. Dimon S. S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117,
124.1
The libel alleges that respondent, doing business in his own and in various trade names, owned
and controlled a passenger vessel, known as the City of Athens, and held out that vessel as a
common carrier of passengers for hire, and that petitioners paid moneys for passage upon the
vessel, scheduled for July 15, 1947, to Europe. A contract for the transportation of passengers
is a maritime contract within admiralty jurisdiction.2 The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411. The
allegations so far mentioned are plainly sufficient to establish such a contract. The libel goes
on to allege a breach of that contract through an abandonment of the voyage. If this were all, it
would be plain that petitioners stated a claim for breach of a maritime contract. But the libel
further alleges that the sums paid by petitioners as passage money were "wrongfully and
deliberately" applied by respondent to his own use and benefit "in reckless disregard of his
obligations to refund [350 U.S. 532, 534] the same" and that respondent "has secreted himself
away and manipulated his assets . . . for the purpose of defrauding" petitioners. Then follow
allegations of certain fraudulent acts and transactions.
The allegations of wrongfulness and fraud do not alter the essential character of the libel. For the
ancient admiralty teaching is that, "The rules of pleading in the admiralty are exceedingly simple
and free from technical requirements." Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Vance, 19 How. 162, 171-
- And see 2 Benedict, American Admiralty (6th ed. 1940), 223, 237. Though these particular
allegations of the libel sound in fraud or in the wrongful withholding of moneys, it is plain in the
context that the obligation to pay the moneys arose because of a breach of the contract to
transport passengers. Lawyers speak of the obligation in terms of indebitatus assumpsit, a
concept whose tortuous development gave expression to "the ethical character of the law." See
Ames. The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 53, 58 (1888). As Mr. Justice Holmes once
put it, "An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an action of assumpsit and to that
extent is referred to a contract even though it be one existing only by fiction of law."
Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
I HAVE INCLUDED A PORTION OF THIS CASE AFTER THIS ONE,
THE INFORMER.
The fiction sometimes distorted the law. A line of authorities emerged to the effect that admiralty
had no jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases "because the implied promise to repay the moneys
which cannot in good conscience be retained - necessary to support the action for money had and
received - is not a maritime contract."3 United Transp. & L. Co. v. New York
& B. T. Line, 185 F. 386, 391. Yet that duty to pay is often referable, [350 U.S. 532, 535] as
here, to the breach of a maritime contract. As Mr. Justice Stone said in Krauss Bros. Co. v.
Dimon S. S. Corp., supra, at 124:
". . . Even under the common law form of action for money had and received there could be
no recovery without proof of the breach of the contract involved in demanding the payment,
and the basis of recovery there, as in admiralty, is the violation of some term of the contract
of affreightment, whether by failure to carry or by exaction of freight which the contract
did not authorize."
The truth is that in a case such as the present one there is neither an actual promise to repay the
passage moneys nor a second contract. The problem is to prevent unjust enrichment from a
maritime contract. See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 Yale L. J. 1. 27
(1933). A court that prevents a maritime contract from being exploited in that way does not
reach beyond the domain of maritime affairs. We conclude that, so long as the claim asserted
arises out of a maritime contract, the admiralty court has jurisdiction over it.
The philosophy of indebitatus assumpsit is, indeed, not wholly foreign to admiralty. Analogous
conceptions of rights based on quasi-contract are found in admiralty. One who saves property
at sea has the right to an award of salvage, regardless of any agreement between him and the
owner. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240, 266; The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 390; 1
Benedict, supra, 117 et seq. Likewise, where cargo is jettisoned, the owner becomes entitled to a
contribution in general average from the owners of other cargo which was saved without the aid
of any agreement. See Barnard v. Adams, 10 How. 270, 303-304; Star of Hope, 9 Wall. 203, 228-
230; 1 Benedict, supra, 98. Other examples could be given. See Chandler, Quasi Contractual
Relief [350 U.S. 532, 536] in Admiralty, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 23 (1928). Rights which admiralty
recognizes as serving the ends of justice are often indistinguishable from ordinary quasicontractual
rights created to prevent unjust enrichment. How far the concept of quasi-contracts
may be applied in admiralty it is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to hold that
admiralty has jurisdiction, even where the libel reads like indebitatus assumpsit at common law,
provided that the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a maritime contract. Such is
the case here.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings in
conformity with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] There is also an apparent conflict with Sword Line v. United States, 228 F.2d 344,
346, decided, after we granted certiorari, by a different panel of the Second Circuit from the one
which sat in the instant case.
[Footnote 2] The Court in New Jersey Steam Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How.
344, 392, stated that in determining admiralty jurisdiction the inquiry is "into the nature and
subject-matter of the contract, - whether it was a maritime contract, and the service a maritime
service, to be performed upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide. And, again, whether the service was to be substantially performed upon the sea, or tidewaters,
although it had commenced and had terminated beyond the reach of the tide; if it was,
then jurisdiction has always been maintained."
[Footnote 3] And see Israel v. Moore & McCormack Co., 295 F. 919; Home Ins. Co. v.
Merchants' Transp. Co., 16 F.2d 372; Silva v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 163 F.2d 602. [350
U.S. 532, 537]
The following is the case cited above that bears importance on
the fiction and how you are compelled to pay an income tax for
your contract with the government. It is based on a level of a
dollar amount which is the possession and use of a federal
Reserve Note which is a debt you had and received in a transfer
to which you are to pay back a portion for the use of the notes.
This is based on the promise to follow all the rules and
regulations as a citizen of, resident therein of the contract, by
implied consent for accepting the artificial character of
individual, which is a word definition defining person in statute
that is the subject of liability. When reading the following
replace "stockholder"/"members" with citizen/person/resident and
"corporation" with State or United States.
Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 235.
There remains only the question whether the liability is of a kind that will be enforced outside of
the California courts. Analysis on this point often is blurred by the vague statement that the
liability is 'contractual.' An obligation to pay money generally is enforced by an action of
assumpsit, and to that extent is referred to a contract, even though it be one existing only by
fiction of law. But such obligations when imposed upon the members of a corporation
may very very largely. The incorporation may create a chartered partnership the members of
which are primary contractors, or it may go no farther than to impose a penalty; or again, it may
create a secondary remedy for a debt treated as that of the corporation alone, like the right to
attach the corporation's real estate; or the liability may be inseparable from the local procedure; or
the law may be so ambiguous as to leave it doubtful whether the liability is matter of remedy, and
local, or creates a contract on the part of the members that will go with them wherever they
are found McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 161 49 L. ed. 702, 705, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410, 3
Ann. Cas. 500; Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U.S. 216, 225, 226 S., 50 L. ed. 732, 736, 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 502, 5 Ann. Cas. 740. In the present case we think that there can be no doubt of the meaning
of the California statute. It reads: 'Each stockholder of a corporation is individually and
personally liable for such proportion of its debts and liabilities,' etc., as we have stated, and
supposes the action against him to be brought 'upon such debt.' Civil Code, 322. This means
that by force of the statute, if the corporation incurs a debt within the juris- [232 U.S. 221, 236]
diction, the stockholder is a party to it, and joins in the contract in the proportion of his
shares.
Now, I hope you are ready to understand what you have read. All
statutes are written for persons, residents, individual s and ar e
premised on one thing, citizenship. Citizenship means you are a
member of the corporate body politic of the state or federal
government. So go ahead and call yourself a citizen of so and so
state and you immediately become a "stockholder" of that State
and assume all its debts. Plus the fact that the State you claim
citizenship in is a "political subdivision" of the United States.
Since all States are corporations and have joined the parent
corporation, The United States, you are bound to a contract as
stated in the cases above. Now you have ASSUMED the character of
a FICTION OF LAW, namely that of a person, to which all statutes
apply. Now in the definition of person the word INDIVIDUAL
describes person in 26 USC 7701 (a) (1). In my books, 'The New
History of America' and 'Which One Are You'. I used two cases
wherein the Judges stated that the defendants did not dispute
that they were NOT United States citizens so they were taxpayers.
Why people did not pick up on this is because there is very
little logical thinking minds anymore to deduce the obvious.
Here is how you become part of a contract, that all talk about
existing, but no one can figure out where this contract is, to
promise to pay the debt of the State and United States. As the
above cases states, it is where ever the person
(stockholder/member) is that the jurisdiction follows. That is
why the IRS can go into a State contrary to what you all believe
that they can not. Oh yes they can, and you did it to yourself
when using a fiction of law and they came right back on that
fiction of law and nailed you with your own actions which you
cannot shake no matter how hard you try. They even went to Mexico
to get the person, and when you now read Cook v Tate, it will
become so clear that you will wonder why you did not see it
before. You did not see it before because you did not have this
information before you to digest.
Here is how they did it and looking back to the cases above it
should be evident to you.
You are born a MAN, not a person, or individual. God created MAN.
Did God create person, individual or citizen? No statutes are
written with Man in them, only person. For only artificial
entities can go after other artificial entities, they cannot
attack MAN. Read " PERSO N " articl e written on www.atgpress.com/
for further clarification.
The constitution is for members only, the States, not people.
People cannot join the Union. To prove it try to join the Union.
States are corporations. People, MAN, can
become a member of a State by registering to vote or taking an
oath to support that contract called a constitution. Once doing
that you are a stockholder and therefore a citizen of that state.
Citizen is an artificial character and a Fiction of Law. The
statutes of contract are geared toward person which is artificial
in character. Now that you have claimed citizenship of a State,
you are deemed by the Courts as a person of artificial character.
Artificial characters have no constitutional protections and are
in the same class as other artificial entities (corporations). To
prove this look at the words that define person in 26 U.S.C. 7701
(a) (1) which are individual, corporation, association,
partnership, trust, estate, and company, all being artificial
entities. Being this is so,your part of the debt of the
government is predicated on the membership (read in the case
above), wherever you might be. The debt the State has to the
United States, as a Union member, is transferred to all its
members to pay a federal income tax. So it matters not where you
are the IRS can go into the state, any state, and has
jurisdiction because you are a "person" described in the statutes
who is resident in their political subdivision, the state.
So you are taken into court and claim that you are a sovereign
citizen. Remember "citizen" is an artificial entity, a Fiction of
Law. "Citizen" is not natural. So the court notes you, by your own
admission, are a "member" of the body politic and proceeds on
that Fiction of Law. You argue you are not the person liable
because the statutes do not define the activity that makes you
liable. The fact of the matter is, is that you are the "person"
in the statute and the taxpayer in 7701 (a) (14). The person is
what makes you liable, not so much the activity.
So as was posted in the Cooper case on the internet, that everyone wants to
believe that the use of the post office makes for dual
citizenship is totally wrong. Dual citizenship is predicated on
the fact you are a "member" of a political subdivision (State)of
the United States, ergo have dual citizenship for taxation as you
are responsible for the debts of both corporations, the State and
the United States. So you are an "individual" required to file an
individual income tax form. I include an excerpt from The New
History of America that proves the point.
U.S. v Slater, 82-2 USTC 9571
"There is a tax imposed, in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1, on the
income of `every individual.' No provision exists in
the tax code exempting from taxation persons who, like
Slater, characterize themselves as somehow standing
apart from the American polity, and the defendant cites
no authority supporting his position. Slater's
protestations to the effect that he derives no benefit
from the United States government have no bearing on
his legal obligation to pay income taxes. (cites
omitted) Unless the defendant can establish that he is
NOT a citizen of the United States, the IRS possesses
authority to attempt to determine his federal tax
liability."
Notice the last sentence, and also, they can only attempt on a
U.S. citizen. Now to the other case which is an Appeal in the
Seventh Circuit and she lost;
Rachel Templeton v Internal Revenue Service, 86-1363 on appeal
from 85 C 457.
"Finally, we address Templeton's second argument in
which she claims that she is not a 'person liable' or a
'taxpayer', as those terms are defined by the Internal
Revenue Code and the relevant case law, and as a result
that the provisions of section 6103 do not apply in her
case. We agree with the district court that this claim
is patently frivolous. As Templeton does NOT dispute
that she is a citizen of the United States, and because
the Code imposes an income tax on `every individual who
is a citizen or resident of the United States,' 26
C.F.R. Sec. 1.1-(1) (a) (1985), it would clearly
contradict the 'plain meaning' of the term to conclude
that Congress did not intend that Templeton be
considered a 'taxpayer' as the term is used throughout
the Code."
In both cases the people claimed to be citizens of (belonging to)
the United States, so the tribunals were absolutely right in
their determinations because they fell under 26 Sec. 1 in USC and
CFR. Most certainly they consented to the jurisdiction in
question. Argue against their codes as mightily as you want, it
matters not. They joined the insurance club as Spooner stated,
didn't they?
END OF EXCERPT.
I don't know how much plainer it can get. That is why I published
the fact that "in law" person, resident, and individual are all
artificial entities. They are working a fiction of law because
you fell right into legal terminology while NOT, in your mind,
thinking the "legal" definitions applied to these terms. You
helped put the nail in your own coffin so to speak, by helping
the fiction of law prevail against you. So all the law that you
use as a defense is for naught. As evidenced from the Slater and
Templeton case, this is exactly what has happened all across this
country in every court case before that time, (look at the Cook v
Tate Case) and every case after that. Now you can appreciate why
you lose by this definition statement to wit;
" a fiction is defined as a false averment on the part of the Plaintiff which the defendant is not
allowed to traverse, the object being to give the court jurisdiction. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd
Ed. (1969) Pg. 468; In the case of "Willful failure to File," the Plaintiff and court invents the
"fiction" that defendant is a "taxpayer", A.K.A. "Person." Motions and briefs which rely on
precepts of law will thereafter be denied or found frivolous."
Now, this is not a false averment on the Plaintiff because YOU
created the fiction of law either by your actions, or inactions
in denying that, you are a registered voter; a resident of a
State; a person, a individual; a member of a State; a citizen of
a State; a United States citizen; that your constitution is
designed to protect you, OR, claiming that you are a sovereign
citizen. Use any of these and you, not them, are operating a
fiction of law. Do you think they are going to tell you all these
things? NO!
So let me play devil's advocate. If you are a "Sovereign citizen"
and claim they are your servants, you are supposed to know all
the law that your servants are to use and you would not use any
of the terms listed in the above paragraph. So why do you use
those terms? Using these terms proves that sovereign citizen is
truly an oxymoron as I have always stated. The reason is,
sovereign is the opposite of citizen. This is what the masses and
the most educated so called "patriot" cannot fathom because of
the fraud and deceit placed upon you since childhood. You carry
the fraud with you to your grave and in doing so pass it on to
your children so everyone believes there is this thing called
sovereign citizen. Why people cannot think for themselves is
beyond me. All one has to do is research the word citizen to see
he is under a legal disability, while Sovereign is not under any
legal disability. The equivalent, respectively, are prose/pro per
and sui juris. Legal terms are not common terms and are drafted
to deceive.
So who is working a fiction of law that will never allow you to
prevail? It is not the government. IT IS YOU. The government
courts are only following the law and what you say. Place
yourself as the judge and you know the "legal terms" that apply
in court. You are bound by oath to give justice. A man comes
before you and claims he is a "person", only not one liable to
pay a income tax. He also claims he is a sovereign citizen of the
State of So & So. He brings in the argument that there is no
statute stating he is required to file an income tax form or pay
a tax. Knowing he has just stated Fictions of law, you have to
rule by the law.
The law says person is liable. He stated he was
a person. Since this " person " has received a transfer over a
certain sum of debt obligations, he, is made liable for the use
and transfer of these debt obligations, see ' Use and Transfer '
and ' Is this what make s you liabl e ' , on atgpress.com. This man
did all the work for you in presenting all the fictions of Law to
convict him. You, as a judge cannot rule against the law. See my
point? Well this concludes another facet of our problem. Not one
single argument will win, but this is as close as you are going
to get. As I say, check my information out and everyone that states it is
wrong. Leave no stone unturned, as you are the one that suffers,
not ME.
Sincerely,
The Informer