【翻译|Ian】受治理的区块链（下）
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以下内容来自微信公共帐号“EOS技术爱好者”，搜索“EOSTechLover”即可订阅，翻译Lochaiching。转载必须保留以上声明。仅授权原文转载。
本文原文链接为http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_working%20draft ，由本号“EOS技术爱好者”翻译。
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The Governed Blockchain
受治理的区块链
作者：Ian Grigg
翻译：Lochaiching
IV. The Governed Blockchain
四、受治理的区块链
The Challenge for Business
商业挑战
Our challenge then is to move the blockchain agenda from supporting the win-lose at the expense of the win-win, to supporting the win-win over the win-lose.
因此，我们的挑战是，将区块链从支持以牺牲其中一方为代价转变为支持共赢。
This is not to say that the zero-sum game, or that win-lose should somehow be forbidden. It's rather to say that our focus is on the win-win because that is where society creates value. Society loses money on the win-lose trade, which is why banks and bankers get richer and people get poorer and those countries that bailed out the banks in 2008 at the expense of the economy are in secular depression. Society - all of us - only create value when we work together and each take a profit out of the trade.
这并不是说应该禁止零和博弈，也不是说应该禁止赢输。而是说我们应该关注的是双赢，因为这是社会创造价值的地方。社会会在只有一方赢家一方输家这样的交易中赔钱，这就是为什么那些在2008年以牺牲经济为代价救助银行的国家处于长期萧条状态，银行和银行家变得越来越有钱，但普通人会变得更穷。社会——我们所有人——只有当我们共同从贸易中努力获利时，才能创造价值。
To encourage win-win we need to provide:
⇒ Open entry & exit
⇒ An environment of repeat transactions, where there is no end in sight,
→ Rules of the game
→ a way to trade (that’s the blockchain thing), and
→ Skin in the game
为了鼓励双赢，我们需要提供:
⇒开放的入口和出口
⇒无穷无尽重复交易的环境
→博弈规则
→一种贸易(区块链事务),和
→风险共担
That latter is a new thing. Skin in the game says that we need a method for Alice to hold Bob to account when he acts up. The method needs teeth, so that the value in play is at risk. We need a structure where our community members can guard themselves against an aggressive party turning a trusting win-win trade into a win-lose by trick, just bad trust or downright crime. There must be repercussions for such actions, there must be skin in the game, so as to hold that aggressor to account.
后者是新事物。风险共担是说我们需要一种Alice的方法来让Bob在他行动的时候考虑到他。这种方法是需要双方唇齿相依的关系，因此其中的价值是处于风险之中的。我们需要一种结构，让我们的社区成员能够防范激进的某一方把原本信任的双赢交易变成了欺骗、信任差或彻头彻尾的犯罪环境。这种行为必然需要承担后果，全员共担其中的风险，以便追究破坏者的责任。
Fixing the Walled Garden
修复整个围墙
A permissioned ledger provides for this, yet the process described above defeats it for the small player.
一个受许可的分类帐本提供了这一点，然而上面描述的过程击败了它的小玩家。
Why is that? A permissioned ledger consists of, let’s say:
◯ A wall around the garden
◓ A gate and a gatekeeper - fees, corruption, exclusion
☆ A set of rules,
☆ A method for applying the rules, aka Dispute Resolution,
☆ Consequences - skin in the game.
这是为什么呢？受许可的分类帐本包括比方说:
◯花园周围有围墙
◓门和看门人——费用、腐败、排斥
☆系列的规则
☆一个方法应用规则，即争议解决
☆后果——风险共担
The problem - the difference between the two above descriptions - is the wall. Let's put them side by side:
问题是——上述两种描述的不同之处在于——围墙。让我们把它们放在一起:
◯ A wall around the garden
◓ A gate and a gatekeeper
⇒ Open entry & exit
⇒ repeat transactions
☆ A set of rules,
☆ A method for applying the rules
☆ Consequences
→ Rules of the game
→ a way to trade
→ Skin in the game
Once there is a wall, we have to have a gate to get into the garden. And once we have a gate, we have to have a gatekeeper. We outlined the barrier to entry costs of the gatekeeper above, but there is another cost we did not mention: Regulation.
一旦有了墙，我们就得有一扇门才能进入花园。一旦我们有了门，我们就需要有一个门卫。我们概述了上述门卫进入成本的障碍是什么，但还有另一个我们没有提到的成本：监管。
Unless someone invents a decentralised wall (!), a decentralised gatekeeper (!!) and a decentralised gate (!!!) then the gatekeeper will be subject to both internal pressures and external pressures. To cut a long story short, our gatekeeper will come under some regulator's control, and will then proceed to place all of the regulator's choice rules in place.
除非有人发明了一堵去中心化的墙(!)，一个去中心化的门卫(!!!)和一个去中心化的门(!!!)，否则门卫将同时要承受到内部压力和外部压力的影响。简单来说就是，我们的看门人将受到监管机构的控制，然后将着手落实监管机构的所有选择规则。
See the problem? Pretty soon we'll be back to centralisation, to being a bank and needing a banking licence. Then everything will clog up and we'll be praying for another 2008 style bailout and a decade of stealth bailout, also known as Quantitative Easing.
看到问题了吗？很快我们就会回到中心化了，成为一家银行，需要一张银行执照。然后，一切都将陷入困境，我们将祈祷另一场2008招式的救助，以及10年的秘密援助，也就是所谓的量化宽松。
A decentralised community cannot be beholden to a gatekeeper. If you're unsure of this, talk to the compliance department of any fiat exchange. Free entry has to be preserved in order for the result to be a community blockchain. Therefore, the decentralised community cannot have a wall nor a gate nor a gatekeeper.
一个去中心化的社区不可能受制于守门人。如果你对此不确定，可以咨询任何fiat交易所的合规部门。为了使结果成为一个社区的区块链，必须保留自由进入。因此，去中心化的社区不能有墙、门、门卫。
Let's tear down the wall.
让我们把墙拆掉。
An Open Park
一个公开的公园
As well as being aligned to the concept of win-win, the rest of the elements above ☆ are not so forceful as centralising influences. In other words, they are not so controllable from outside the environment of your community’s blockchain. It turns out that we can decentralise these elements and create our system of governance with control in the hands of the community.
作为对齐到双赢的概念，其余上面☆的元素不算非常中心化的影响。换句话说，在社区区块链环境之外，它们不是那么可控。事实证明，我们可以将这些要素去中心化，并在社区掌握控制权的情况下创建我们的治理体系。
In brief, opening the Walled Garden into perhaps an Open Park with a posted notice board looks like this:
· The set of rules is a Constitution.
◦ It is offered and accepted on entry,
◦ It applies to every access, every transaction, every contract, every post.
◦ It points to the method of dispute resolution which is agreed in the same way,
◦ And, as a community document, we require:
· A method for the community to change … everything! A decentralised voting mechanism such as Delegated Proof of Stake (Larimer, 2017) does the trick, and can control change to:
◦ the rules! The Constitution can be controlled and voted by the community
◦ Software changes, too 😊
◦ important roles such as Block Producers, Arbitrators
· The forum of Dispute Resolution [Nagy&Shakel, 2008].
◦ Based on the Arbitration Act of all countries, which is to say, it’s legal 😊
◦ Unifies everyone under the same code (the Constitution) which smooths out any local advantages.
◦ Allows Arbitrators to be appointed by the community’s voting mechanism
◦ (And, did we mention, the rules are managed by the community!)
· An enforcement method for actions
◦ Decentralised voting can change the chain and rules.
◦ Rulings can be enforced by block producers.
◦ Rulings can also reach out to external world.
◦ Ultimately, a ruling enforced can take value or eject a person.
简而言之，将带围墙的花园开放成一个开放的公园，上面贴着告示板，看起来是这样的:
·这里的规则是公约（Constitution）。
◦提供和接受的入口,
◦适用于每一个访问、每笔交易、每一个合同、每一个职位。
◦它同意以同样的方式解决指向的争议方法,
◦作为一个社区文档，我们需要:
·一切改变社区的方法！一种去中心化的投票机制，如委托证明股权(Larimer, 2017)就能起到作用，并可以控制改变:
◦规则！公约（Constitution）可以由社区控制和投票产生
◦软件的改变也是一样😊
◦重要的角色比如BP、仲裁员
·争端解决论坛[Nagy&Shakel, 2008]。
◦基于仲裁的所有国家都是合法的😊
◦统一每个人都在相同的代码(公约)来让任何当地的优势趋于平滑。
◦允许指定的仲裁员社区的投票机制
◦(正如我们提到，规则是由社区管理的!)
·行动的执行方法
◦去中心化的投票可以改变链和规则
◦BP可以执行裁决
◦裁决也可以接触到外部世界。
◦最终裁决执行可以让一个人带来价值或者出局。
Why does this work? Firstly, the will of the community. It is not the wall that holds the person to account, it is the community, using the tools found inside. The rules are enforced by the members according to a process that is already agreed.
为什么是这个工作呢？首先，这是社区的意愿。这不是让人解释的墙，而是社区使用内部的工具。这些规则由成员根据已经商定的流程执行。
Secondly, in economics terms, the constitution forms a Schelling point to which everyone agrees on entry. This agreement, this constitution is sticky - when push comes to shove, most will stick to the rules, because they see that most will stick to the rules.
其次，从经济学的角度来看，公约形成了一个人人都同意的切入点。这个协议，也就是这个公约是棘手的——当到了紧要关头，大多数人会遵守规则，因为他们看到大多数人会遵守规则。
Then, the grievances can follow a path agreed by the community. The rules direct their grievances to the Arbitrator, who creates a Ruling, which can then act as a call to action encouraging the community to enforce. As the system starts to work, supporters gather and the process becomes the Community.
然后，不满情绪就会沿着社区同意的道路发展。这些规则将他们的不满传达给了仲裁员，也就是执行了裁决的那些人，然后可以作为号召社区强制执行的号召。当系统开始工作时，支持者聚集在一起，这个过程就形成了社区。
Finally, signalling: those smart criminals who are looking for easy marks will realise there are barriers here that will cost more and raise their risks. The the rules and rulings act as a filtering device. Crooks then analyse whether it is better to go to some other garden.
最后，发出信号：那些想要轻松得分的聪明罪犯会意识到，这里存在着成本更高、风险更高的障碍。这些规则和裁决就像一个过滤装置。然后，骗子们分析是否有更好下手的花园。
Further Research (of course)
更多的搜索
There are three missing elements in this description which we have to leave out of scope.
在这个描述中有三个缺失的元素，我们必须在范围之外省略它们。
One is Identity. As a consequence of the need to build trust over an extended series of trades (Alice’s Trust RADR above), Alice needs to be able to remember Bob and recall how her last decision went, before she relies on him again. Identity is a very deep and interesting topic in itself, but it is too big for this essay; interested readers are referred to the Identity Cycle [Grigg, 2015-2018] .
一个是身份。由于需要在一系列的交易中建立信任(之前的Alice的trust RADR)， Alice需要能够记住Bob并回忆起她最后的决定是如何进行的，然后再依据这些线索进行下一步。身份本身是一个非常深刻和有趣的话题，但是对于这篇文章来说它太大了;有兴趣的读者请参阅身份循环[Grigg, 2015-2018（http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_Grigg,%202015-2018）]。
Second, the technical security model. Multisig arrangements, recovery partners, time-delay transactions, staking and hardware wallets are all useful components (Larimer, 2017) that when deployed in concert with a strong Constitution and Arbitration framework will make the job of the criminal much harder.
二是技术安全模型。 Multisig安排、恢复伙伴、交易延迟、质押和硬件钱包都是有用的组件(Larimer, 2017)，如果与强大的公约和仲裁框架一起部署，将使罪犯的工作变得更加困难。
Thirdly, how to impose the Constitution on entry? This can be handled with a mix of two elements. (1) Technically by making the Constitution into a Ricardian Contract - one which is both machine and human readable, and critically has its hash placed into any relevant communications with users[Grigg, 2004]. Then, (2) legally, by having the Constitution include a clause that describes how third party operators and developers take on the responsibility for fairly presenting the Constitution to users. Their software can then ensure that users enter into the agreement, as signalled by the presence of the hash, to which all recipients may rely. Interested readers are referred to NortonRoseFulbright's "Legal Analysis of the Governed Blockchain" [NortonRoseFulbright, 2018].
第三，如何在进入时就能实施公约？这可以通过两个元素的混合来处理(1)。从技术上讲，通过公约变成一份李嘉图合约——一份机器可读的、人类可读的合约，并严格地将其哈希置于与用户的任何相关通信中[Grigg, 2004]。然后，(2)法律上，通过公约包含一项条款，描述第三方经营者和开发商如何承担向用户公平地展示公约的责任。接着，他们的软件可以确保用户签署协议，如哈希的存在所示，所有接收方都可以依赖哈希。感兴趣的读者可以参考NortonRoseFulbright对“被统治的区块链”[NortonRoseFulbright, 2018（http://iang.org/papers/the_governed_blockchain.html#ref_NortonRoseFulbright,%202018）]的“法律分析”。
Conclusion
结论
"The principle of open entry is important for blockchain robustness, yet open entry can also occur within a range of actors that does not include the whole humanity, but only those that accept some rules and satisfy some requirements."
[Morini, 2017] .
“开放进入的原则对区块链的健壮性很重要，但开放进入也可能发生在不包括整个人类的范围内，而只发生在那些接受某些规则并满足某些需求的参与者之中。”
[Morini,2017)。
A governed blockchain is one which has free entry, but conditions apply on entry (Morini 2017). Primarily those conditions are rules of behaviour, encoded in a Constitution, and include two critical elements: a forum for dispute resolution and a method for changing the rules.
一个受治理的区块链是一个有自由进入，但此处的进入是有条件的(Morini 2017)。这些条件主要是构成公约的行为规则，包括两个关键要素：解决争端的论坛和改变规则的方法。
We present it as a third alternative to the permissioned and unpermissioned blockchains (Swanson, 2015).
我们将其作为许可和不许可的区块链的第三种替代方案(Swanson, 2015)。
Up until recently, blockchains had been characterised as unpermissioned or permissioned, and this was thought to be the only choice. More limiting, to a large extent it was believed the two are incompatible, the choice is exclusive.
直到最近，区块链一直被认为是未经许可或许可的，这被认为是唯一的选择。更有限的是，在很大程度上，人们认为两者是不相容的，被认为这个选择是排他性只能存在其一的。
We offer a third choice, the Governed Blockchain. By identifying the components that differ, we find that one component - free entry versus the wall - is key, and it can be modified to create a third, safer alternative suitable for business.
我们提供第三种选择——治理区块链。通过识别不同的组件，发现一个组件的自由进入和此处的围墙是最为关键的，并且可以修改它以创建第三种更安全的适合于商业的替代选择。
A community of enforceable rules creates an open garden. A community in an open garden can cultivate win-win trade for the people. A community of win-win traders can build an economy for their mutually beneficial future. And finally, a mutually protective community can finally invite in the mass market.
一个具有可执行规则的社区创造了一个开放的花园。一个开放的花园社区可以为人民创造双赢的贸易。一个双赢的交易者社区可以为他们的互利未来建立一个经济体。最终，一个相互保护的社区可以邀请大众市场。
The working draft of the paper was at: "The Governed Blockchain" - google docs https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TKegYdH5ASqGlEWiVDYFMubE7651hsZIuZb8FKO8KNk/edit#. ...
这是一份草稿版本的文件《受治理的区块链》。
References
[working draft] "The Governed Blockchain" - google docs https://docs.google.com/document/d/1TKegYdH5ASqGlEWiVDYFMubE7651hsZIuZb8FKO8KNk/edit#.
[Grigg, 2017a] Ian Grigg, 2017a; "EOS: An Introduction," iang.org/papers/EOS_An_Introduction.pdf
[Larimer, 2017] Dan Larimer, 2017; "EOS Technical White Paper," github.com/EOSIO/Documentation
[Swanson, 2015] Tim Swanson, 2015; "Consensus-as-a-Service," http://www.ofnumbers.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Permissioned-distributed-ledgers.pdf
[Buterin, 2015] Vitalik Buterin, 2015; "On Public and Private Blockchains," https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/
[Evans, 2017] Charles Evans, 2017 "Delegated Proof of Stake: Between Anarchy and Leviathan," working paper forthcoming.
[Porter, 1979] Michael E. Porter, 1979; "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy," Harvard Business Review Vol 59, No 2.
[Wikipedia] Wikipedia, "Risk Matrix," wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_matrix
[Kerckhoffs, 1883] Auguste Kerckhoffs; "La cryptographie militaire ('Military cryptography')," Journal des sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5-38, Jan. 1883, pp. 161-191, Feb. 1883. http://www.petitcolas.net/kerckhoffs/la_cryptographie_militaire_i.htm Kerckhoffs' 6th Principle is, "Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that command its application, that the system be easy to use, requiring neither mental strain nor the knowledge of a long series of rules to observe."
[Narayanan, 2015] Arvind Narayanan, 2015; "Analyzing the 2013 Bitcoin fork: centralized decision-making saved the day," Freedom to Tinker blog https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2015/07/28/analyzing-the-2013-bitcoin-fork-centralized-decision-making-saved-the-day/
[Grigg, 2017b] Ian Grigg, 2017b; “Life is a Cabaret… Or how to split and merge a blockchain,” Financial Cryptography steemit.com/eos/@iang/life-is-a-cabaret-or-how-to-split-and-merge-a-blockchain
[Gupta, 2014] Vinary Gupta, 2014; "[Bitcoin] Cannot be divorced from pre-existing political theory," IAmSatoshi Interview, youtube.com/watch?v=FHFSvttMg6E
[Grigg, 2016] Ian Grigg, 2016; "On Trust," working paper, Part II of Identity Cycle.
[Harari, 2015] Yuval Noah Harari, 2015; “What explains the rise of humans?” TEDGlobalLondon https://www.ted.com/talks/yuval_noah_harari_what_explains_the_rise_of_humans
[Sgantzos 2017] Konstantinos Sgantzos "Implementing A Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle Machine on a Blockchain," forthcoming, HSCBB 2017
[Panchèvre, 2015 (my emphasis)] Ian Maya Panchèvre, 2015; "Immaterial World:The Virtual Politics of Bitcoin."
[Garzik, 2010] Jeff Garzik, 2010; "Strange block 74638," Bitcointalk
[Güring&Grigg, 2011] Phillip Güring & Ian Grigg, 2011; "Bitcoin & Gresham’s Law - the economic inevitability of Collapse," working paper
[Swanson, 2017] Tim Swanson, 2017; "Eight Things Cryptocurrency Enthusiasts Probably Won't Tell You," working paper
[Nagy&Shakel, 2008] Daniel Nagy, Nadzeya Shakel, 2008; "OpenPGP-based Financial Instruments and Dispute Arbitration,” Financial Cryptography 2008,
[Grigg, 2015-2018] Ian Grigg, 2015-2018; Identity Cycle, working cycle of papers, at https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/0B9aJ9_ZDMOjMbVRIMUNZdUJLakU
[Grigg, 2004] Ian Grigg, 2004, "The Ricardian Contract," First IEEE International Workshop on Electronic Contracting, iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html
[NortonRoseFulbright, 2018] Adam Sanitt & Ian Grigg, 2018; "Legal Analysis of the Governed Blockchain," NortonRoseFulbright, forthcoming
[Morini, 2017] Massimo Morini, 2017; "2018: The Year We Make Cont(r)act," Coindesk
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